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II
Churchill: The G lim m er of H ope in Britain's Dark Days

By Jaime Konieczny ‘07

When World War II broke out in 1939,Winston Churchill was not the British
Prime Minister. However, he had been a Member of Parliament for forty years and as the
war steadily increased in intensity his tenacious leadership inspired the country to elect
him as Prime Minister by May o f 1940. It has been said that he was one of the greatest
leaders in the 20th century because of his inspiration, aggressive leadership and refusal to
surrender. Along with his dynamic spirit, Churchill’s creation and appointment of the
position Minister of Defense in 1940 was crucial for Britain’s perseverance during the
darkest time of World War II (June 1940-41). Through the establishment of this position
and his own personal knowledge Churchill was able to effectively direct and control the
war effort and create an atmosphere of hope in an uncertain time for the British people,
which ultimately lead to their victory in the war.
Churchill created the position o f Minister of Defense primarily because of his
previous concerns about the lack of effective administrative organization and control of
wartime activities. He feared the lack o f centralized information and decision-making.
This fear had developed over his time in political office because he had taken part in and
witnessed many issues develop from this lack of centralization. He began his role in
politics before the First World War, attempting amelioration between the British and
German naval rivalry in 1913.1 In 1914 he was appointed First Lord of the Admiralty
with duties that included the air defense of London and the protection o f the Royal Navy
and merchant shipping from German naval attack. In 1917 he was put in charge of the
munitions production in Britain, which during this time was of great importance because
supplies were low and strained. As his popularity began to grow he was designated as the
diplomatic leader to devise a planned system of demobilization in order to calm and
appease the tensions o f the unsatisfied soldiers returning from the war.2
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These experiences helped Churchill develop a better understanding of politics and
the inter-working o f military defense strategy, all o f which he later drew upon when he
was reappointed First Lord of the Admiralty in 1939 and further still when elected Prime
Minister in 1940. Many o f his experiences helped him develop and establish one o f his
core ideas: that military intelligence needed a centralized person to which to report in
order to better facilitate the actions necessary to quickly and efficiently protect British
interests.
During the outbreak o f World War II, Winston Churchill was not the most
popular man in the British political world. In fact he was alienated and ostracized by both
his party and the labor movement after speaking out against the Munich Conference in
September 1938 that gave the Sudetenland to Germany. He prophesized more doom and
dismay to come.3 Yet despite this gloomy outlook on the present events, some of the
most important assets Churchill possessed during the winter of 1938-39 were his unique
isolationist stance and his obstinate opposition to appeasement4 It was because of this
isolation that as the war progressed he was capable of speaking out and gaining public
support. By May of 1939 a Gallop poll questioned the public asking “Are you in favour
of Mr. Winston Churchill being invited to join the Cabinet?” 56% of those polled
answered yes.5 He regained popularity slowly, beginning with the help of the “anti
appeasement section o f the press” and continuing this growth through his actions and
through a round of speeches delivered when he was appointed First Lord o f Admiralty.
His actions were drastically different from those of Prime Minister Chamberlain, who
often seemed ill at ease as a war minister. Churchill raised the morale of the people
simply by possessing a beaming face and exuberant style while holding office.6
Churchill’s full recovery from political isolation and public support occurred after
two speeches, the first o f which was on Sept. 26,1939. While delivering a review o f the
war at sea, one member o f the House of Commons noted, “One could feel the spirits of
the House rising with every word.” The second speech occurred as a broadcast on Oct 1,
1939 on the state o f the war and the British war effort during which it was described as
“even more prime ministerial performance.”7 These were key moments that instilled
hope, revived spirits and allowed trust from the British people and from Parliament. The
hope Churchill gave the people was not from the words he spoke but in the manner,
intonation and grace with which he said them, for “The effect o f Winston’s speech was
infinitely greater than could be derived from any reading of the text.”8 The effect o f his
speeches was to add to his continuous growth in popularity as well as to lead to a deeper
respect and admiration by the British people.
Due to the increase in support for Churchill and the failing self-confidence of
Chamberlain with the debacle at Norway, Churchill was elected the successor to
Chamberlain as the British Prime Minister in May of 1940. Following his election to the
premiership, Churchill set about evaluating all aspects of British foreign policy. He
determined that Britain would not only remain in the war but would continue to take the
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offensive against Hitler wherever possible. It was Churchill’s own strength o f conviction
and determination to be victorious in the war that squelched any thought o f peace through
appeasement. Britain was now committed not only to fighting, but to winning World
War II.9 He “had come to power to prosecute the war more forcefully,”10 and began
doing so by creating new positions within the Executive Departments. His first action as
Prime Minister created the position and title o f Minister o f Defense, which he then
appointed himself. By creating this position he effectively took the central control of the
war away from the War Cabinet who had conducted the war efforts under Chamberlain.
The reason behind this new position was that the war should be centralized, in fact “he
followed the war on all fronts in great detail with the aid of a portable Map Room.” One
o f the main facets of this position was that Churchill now had the right both to summon
the Chiefs of Staff and to give them instructions on the conduct o f war.11
Through this position the military secretariat o f the War Cabinet and the Chiefs of
Staff Committee were incorporated into a small department under his direct control. The
War Cabinet met almost daily and made all the fundamental decisions of the war with
regard to Churchill’s opinion and wishes. His aide General Ismay and his two deputies,
who had control of the Joint Planning Committee and the Joint Intelligence Committee,
headed the Defense Office. It reported directly to him, something that had never been
done before.12 Both committees were in charge of establishing the feasibility o f the plans
submitted to them by both Churchill himself and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.13 By creating
this office and applying his own experiences and understanding o f how the war should be
fought Churchill effectively changed the course of the British defense system. He had
eliminated any internal fighting or conflicts by systematically taking full control so that
by the middle of the war he no longer called meetings with the Defense Committee of the
War Cabinet but instead ran the military aspect o f the war through his personal thoughts
and the Chiefs of Staff Committee. As a wartime leader he was greatly respected but
often ran his staff very hard.14
Churchill demanded as much from himself as he did from the staff with which he
worked. He gave everything he had, and told the English people he had to offer “nothing
but blood, toil, tears and sweat.” He sacrificed in order to keep the British morale alive
and to fulfill his promise that “[w]e shall defend our island, whatever the cost may
be.. .we shall never surrender.” In his attempts to keep the war effort contained and
controlled directly he demanded up-to-the-minute updates from all fronts o f the war.
During the height of the Battle o f Britain he lived in a bunker beneath the Cabinet office
where he could be reached at all times and could also make radio broadcasts to the British
citizens.15 He did not keep regular work hours because his work was everywhere. From
his home and office every one of his advisors, secretaries and Generals could be sent for
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at any time of the day or night in order to be dictated notes and orders. This was vastly
different from Chamberlain who had conducted everything through the process of formal
meetings and arranged times.16
For Churchill the work did not end and he constantly needed to be in the know
and in the thick o f whatever was going on. This often caused him to run out in between
bombings during the Battle of Britain so that he could view the damage from a firsthand
account. He would later assess it as Prime Minister and Minister of Defense.17 After
Churchill was given information he was often able to see the larger picture and theorize
Hitler’s next move from a political and ideological aspect. This unique ability was
derived from his many years of experience and his understanding o f the German
maneuvers during WWI. Due to this he often suggested plans that the British Intelligence
community did not understand because they viewed Hitler’s strategy only from their own
military viewpoints while failing to learn the lessons o f history. Churchill’s main
conclusion, reached in a “lightening flash” of illumination, was that Hitler would
probably attack the Soviet Union after defeating Great Britain or possibly even before. In
May o f 1941 he sent a letter of warning to Stalin but Stalin did not heed the warning. His
foresight and intuitive analysis of Hitler’s intention to move East helped him have a
better understanding of the influx o f the information filtering through London.18
Another essential aspect of Churchill as Prime Minister and Minster of Defense
was that he recognized the desperate need for aide to Great Britain. Churchill was
determined to stand his ground and never surrender, but he was also not above asking for
help. He directed his pleas to President Roosevelt and the United States. Churchill was
convinced even before his appointment as Prime Minister that if Great Britain did not
gain support from another country, the results could be devastating. Therefore Churchill’s
other great act in the spring and summer of 1940 was to convince President Roosevelt
that Great Britain was still willing and able to fight and therefore was worthy of their
support.19 Knowing that U.S. support was essential to the survival Britain, both U.S. and
British media sources began proliferating propaganda throughout the U.S. proclaiming
Churchill as a national hero as soon as he was elected Prime Minister. This was designed
to spark public support in favor o f accepting a deal such as the Lend Lease Act,
legislation that was proposed by Churchill in a letter to President Roosevelt. Churchill’s
ability to produce a spirited and rising oration made his U.S. observers enthralled with his
“extrovert style of leadership” and was a great asset in garnering Congressional support.20
The Lend Lease Act was enacted by Congress in 1941.
After gathering support from the U.S., Churchill was equipped to devote the
necessary time to promote and plan projects for British offensive landings on the beaches
o f Norway, Sicily, Italy and North Africa. Churchill’s military approach was an almost
entirely offensive strategy to thwart the enemy at any feasible location. He was not a
calculated strategist; he often was caught closely examining one area and then soon
fixating on another target. However, by being able to understand the method o f Hitler’s
strategy and using his previous experience Churchill was capable o f turning the tide of
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the war by means of “constant action as wide scale as possible so that the enemy would
be made to continually ‘bleed and bum,’ a phrase he often used.”21
Churchill’s other great feat was putting aside political and personal dislikes in
order to ally with the Soviet Union to form a tight, cohesive alliance with the goal of
attacking Germany from all sides. He saw this as almost an act of treachery and would
not have agreed except as acting Minister o f Defense the mere size o f the Soviet Union
offered an unquestionable strategic advantage o f sheer manpower against the Germans. It
also showed the ability to support the Eastern Front, possibly allowing for the
establishment o f democratic ideas at the war’s end. Thus, through the arguments and
coercion o f President Roosevelt, Churchill agreed to ally Great Britain with the Soviet
Union and participate in active talks with Stalin. This was essential to the war because it
showed that Churchill, although gruff and stubborn, would and could do what he deemed
necessary for the British success in the war effort.22
Winston Churchill as a Prime Minister effectively inspired and guided the British
through the grimmest part o f the war while still giving them hope. As Minister of
Defense he created a brand-new system in which the war would operate effectively under
his direct control. He was making strategic military alliances in which he procured the
necessary supplies and support to manage British survival. “As a war leader, he was head
and shoulders above anyone the British or any other nation could produce. He was
indispensable and completely irreplaceable.”23 Therefore it was Churchill and his
political, ideological and military leadership combined with his previous experiences that
sternly and miraculously led a fighting, hopeful Great Britain through June o f 1940-1941;
and ultimately to victory.
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